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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case calls upon us to revisit the issue of"complete 
preemption" under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a), in the context 
of a lawsuit claiming medical malpractice, a question we 
last considered in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 
350 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The plaintiffs, Steven and Michelle Bauman, brought suit 
in a New Jersey state court for damages arising from the 
death of their newborn daughter, Michelina Bauman. The 
complaint names as defendants Kamilah Nemeh, M.D. (the 
pediatrician responsible for the treatment of Michelina); 
Kennedy Hospital in Washington Township, New Jersey (the 
hospital where Michelina was born); and The Health 
Maintenance Organization of New Jersey, Inc., a subsidiary 
of U.S. Healthcare, Inc. (collectively "the HMO") (the health 
maintenance organization of which the Baumans were 
members). The complaint asserts direct tort claims against 
all three defendants and also alleges vicarious liability on 
the part of Kennedy Hospital and the HMO. 
 
U.S. Healthcare, joined by the other defendants,filed a 
removal petition, basing federal jurisdiction on the doctrine 
of complete preemption under section 502 of ERISA. U.S. 
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Healthcare then moved in the District Court for dismissal 
or, in the alternative, summary judgment on the ground 
that all of the Baumans' claims were subject to express 
preemption under section 514(a) of ERISA. The Baumans 
moved to remand, arguing that there was no federal 
jurisdiction over any of their claims. The District Court 
granted U.S. Healthcare's motion in part, concluding that 
federal jurisdiction exists over Count Six of the Baumans' 
complaint by virtue of the complete preemption doctrine. 
The court further concluded that Count Six was subject to 
express preemption under ERISA section 514(a) and it 
therefore dismissed that count. Having dismissed the only 
count for which it found there was federal jurisdiction, the 
District Court then declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the remaining counts against U.S. 
Healthcare and the other defendants and remanded them 
to state court under 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3). 
 
U.S. Healthcare has filed both a Petition for a Writ of 
Mandamus and a Notice of Appeal from the District Court's 
order. The Baumans have cross-appealed the District 
Court's order dismissing Count Six and denying their 
motion to remand all their claims to New Jersey state court 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1447. 
 
I. 
 
Michelle Bauman gave birth to Michelina Bauman at 
Kennedy Hospital in Washington Township, New Jersey, on 
May 16, 1995. In accordance with the health care benefits 
pre-certification provided by the HMO, Dr. Nemeh, an 
independent health care provider contracting with the 
HMO, discharged mother and newborn from the hospital 
after twenty-four hours. On May 18, the day after Michelina 
was discharged and two days after she was born, the 
Baumans noticed that Michelina was ill. They made 
numerous telephone calls to Doctor Nemeh, but she did not 
advise them to bring Michelina back to the hospital. They 
also contacted U.S. Healthcare and requested an in-home 
visit by a pediatric nurse, but no such nurse was provided. 
Michelina contracted a Group B strep infection that was 
undiagnosed and untreated. It developed into meningitis 
and she died that same day. 
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The Baumans' complaint was filed in New Jersey 
Superior Court, Camden County, in May 1997. We address 
only the four counts against U.S. Healthcare.1 In Count 
One, the Baumans allege that the U.S. Healthcare policy 
"encouraged, pressured, and/or directly or indirectly 
required" the twenty-four hour pre-certified discharge used 
by the doctor and hospital. App. at 16. In implementing 
this policy, the complaint continues, U.S. Healthcare acted 
"without adequate consideration" for the policy's medical 
appropriateness and "without due care for the health and 
safety" of members and their children. App. at 16. Count 
One also includes a claim for vicarious liability against U.S. 
Healthcare for the negligence of its alleged agents Nemeh 
and Kennedy Hospital in prematurely discharging the 
newborn after only twenty-four hours while the infection 
went undiagnosed. 
 
Count Two alleges that Michelina did not receive timely 
diagnosis and treatment of the deadly infection. The count 
states that U.S. Healthcare's adoption of the twenty-four- 
hour pre-certified discharge policy, despite U.S. 
Healthcare's knowledge that newborns were at risk for 
developing diseases and that the policy would delay 
diagnosis and treatment, manifested reckless indifference to 
the "health consequences of its policy" and was "motivated 
only by the financial profit" realizable from having to pay 
for only a single day in hospital. App. at 17. 
 
The Baumans allege in Count Five that U.S. Healthcare 
negligently adopted "policies with respect to hospital 
utilization" that discouraged participating physicians from 
"re-admitting infants to the hospital when health problems" 
arose after discharge. App. at 20. They also allege that U.S. 
Healthcare negligently "fail[ed] to exercise due care in the 
selection, supervision, training, and/or monitoring" of Dr. 
Nemeh. App. at 20. This count includes both a direct 
negligence claim and a vicarious liability claim for the 
failure to diagnose and treat Michelina's infection. 
 
Count Six alleges that in light of the discharge, 
Michelina's "medically appropriate care" required an in- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Neither Nemeh nor Kennedy Hospital is a party to the appeal or the 
petition for writ of mandamus. 
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home visit by a pediatric nurse to "ensure [her] health and 
well-being." App. at 21. The Baumans requested such a 
visit in their May 18 phone call and, according to the 
complaint, the plan's L'il Appleseed Program assured such 
visits, which U.S. Healthcare negligently failed to provide in 
this instance. This count also included negligence claims 
against the hospital and doctor for their failure to report 
Michelina's birth to the HMO, which would have supported 
the request for a pediatric nurse. 
 
On June 12, 1997, U.S. Healthcare removed the action to 
the District Court for the District of New Jersey on the 
ground that section 502(a) of ERISA provides federal 
jurisdiction over the complaint by virtue of the "complete 
preemption" doctrine. A month later, the Baumans moved 
to remand the case to state court. While the case was in the 
District Court, U.S. Healthcare requested dismissal of all 
four counts or claims against it on the basis of section 
514(a) express preemption under ERISA. 
 
The District Court remanded Counts One, Two and Five, 
but did so pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3) rather than 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1447(c) as the Baumans requested. The 
court denied the motion to remand Count Six and, as to 
that count, granted U.S. Healthcare's motion to dismiss. 
 
In its opinion dated March 30, 1998, the District Court 
explained these rulings as follows: The court held that 
removal was proper because Count Six states a claim that 
fits within the scope of section 502(a) of ERISA (covering 
claims "to recover benefits due" under the terms of the 
plan), and that therefore it had subject matter jurisdiction 
under the doctrine of "complete preemption." It held, 
concomitantly, that Count Six was expressly preempted 
under section 514(a) of ERISA and should be dismissed. 
See Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 420, 
425 (D.N.J. 1998). However, the District Court held that the 
other three counts pled against U.S. Healthcare were not 
completely preempted. Id. at 423-24. It then exercised its 
discretion and remanded those claims to state court under 
28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3), reasoning that the case was 
relatively early in its proceedings and the single dismissed 
claim providing subject matter jurisdiction was relatively 
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minor among all the claims asserted against U.S. 
Healthcare. Id. at 426. 
 
On April 1, the District Court amended its original order 
to state that it dismissed Count Six with respect to U.S. 
Healthcare only. The remand of the other counts was not 
changed. 
 
U.S. Healthcare filed a timely notice of appeal as well as 
a separate petition for a writ of mandamus. The Baumans 
cross-appealed the court's dismissal of Count Six and 
denial of their motion to remand under 28 U.S.C.S 1447(c). 
This court referred the petition for a writ of mandamus to 
a merits panel and directed a consolidated briefing 
schedule for the appeal, cross-appeal, and petition. 
Additionally, we granted the motion of the Secretary of 
Labor to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of the 
Baumans. 
 
II. 
 
We must first consider our jurisdiction to hear this case. 
See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 228- 
29 (3d Cir. 1998). The District Court held that there was 
federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331 after removal, based on its ruling that Count Six 
was completely preempted under ERISA; it also ruled that 
it therefore had supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(a) over the remaining state law counts. Before we 
consider the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction, we 
must decide whether we have appellate jurisdiction. This, 
in turn, depends on whether the District Court's amended 
order dismissing Count Six and remanding the case to state 
court is a final decision, or, if not, whether we should 
exercise mandamus jurisdiction. 
 
A. 
 
In the original order dated March 31, 1998, the District 
Court stated, inter alia, that "U.S. Healthcare's Motion to 
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment is 
granted in part, and Count Six of Plaintiff's Complaint is 
dismissed." App. at 171. The court proceeded to remand 
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Counts One through Five, Seven, and Eight to the state 
court. In the order amended on April 1, the District Court 
modified only the dismissal of Count Six, stating that 
"Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed as to U.S. Healthcare 
only." Bauman, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 426 (the"Amended Order").2 
 
However, the District Court's opinion expressly set forth 
its intention to dispose of the entire case. See id. ("[T]his 
Court finds that it is proper to remand the remainder of this 
action to state court." (emphasis added)). In the conclusion 
of its opinion, the court stated "[T]his Court will enter an 
appropriate order remanding the remainder of the case" to 
the New Jersey state court. Id. (emphasis added). In Ford 
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 286 
(3d Cir. 1991), we stated, "Should there be `any ambiguity 
or obscurity or if the judgment fails to express the rulings 
in the case with clarity or accuracy, reference may be had 
to the findings and the entire record for the purpose of 
determining what was decided.' " (quoting Security Mutual 
Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 621 F.2d 1062, 1066 
(10th Cir. 1980)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the Amended Order failed to dispose expressly of Count Six 
as it applied to the hospital and doctor, counsel for both U.S. Healthcare 
and the Baumans agreed at oral argument that the District Court 
intended to remand all of the remaining claims, and that its failure to do 
so was merely a clerical or technical oversight. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(a) provides that clerical or technical errors may be 
corrected at any time, even after an appeal has beenfiled. See In re West 
Tex. Marketing Corp., 12 F.3d 497, 504 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 
Remand for this purpose is not always necessary. See 11 Charles Alan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & May Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d S 2856, at 251-52 (2d ed. 1995) (Notwithstanding the 
availability of Rule 60(a)'s mechanism for obtaining a correction from the 
district court, appellate courts "have treated clerical errors, 
oversights, 
and omissions as if they had been corrected and have not required the 
formality of a correction by the district court."). For example, in a case 
in which the jury rendered verdicts on both causes of action sued upon, 
but the district court entered only one judgment, this court deemed the 
failure of the district court to enter two judgments an "obvious clerical 
error" and treated the appeal as if two judgments had been entered 
without requiring the parties to return to "a presently very much 
overburdened United States District Court for technical correction." 
Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711, 714 n.2 (3d Cir. 1957). 
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We, therefore, conclude that the District Court intended 
to remand the claims against Kennedy Hospital and Dr. 
Nemeh in Count Six to the state court but, through a 
clerical error, overlooked amending the final paragraph of 
its order to reflect this disposition. In light of our precedent, 
see note 2 supra, we treat the order as one that remanded 
all non-dismissed claims, and one that is accordingly final. 
Consequently, we turn now to the nature of our 
jurisdiction. 
 
B. 
 
Following the District Court's holdings that there was 
subject matter jurisdiction over Count Six under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 
claims, the court invoked its discretionary authority to 
decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction and remanded 
the non-dismissed counts and claims under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(c)(3), rather than under 28 U.S.C.S 1447(c), which 
governs remand when subject matter jurisdiction is wholly 
lacking. Had it used the latter statute we would have no 
appellate jurisdiction, as that section precludes review of a 
district court's remand except in limited circumstances not 
applicable here. See 28 U.S.C. S 1447(d) ("an order 
remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. . ."). 
Although S 1367 does not contain a similar bar to appellate 
jurisdiction following a discretionary remand, the Baumans 
contend the remand order cannot be reviewed because it is 
not final under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Indeed, the order that 
U.S. Healthcare appeals from -- an order partially denying 
a motion to dismiss -- is interlocutory in nature and not 
ordinarily appealable under S 1291. See, e.g., Akerly v. Red 
Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 
U.S. Healthcare counters with substantial authority from 
this court to support reviewability. It cites Hudson United 
Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 
1998), as approving appellate jurisdiction of a district 
court's order dismissing the federal counts and then 
exercising its discretionary power under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(c)(3) to remand the remaining claims. It also cites 
Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 1994), 
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where we accepted appellate jurisdiction under the 
collateral order doctrine after the district court dismissed a 
party and then, using its discretion, remanded the case. 
 
We find most apt and controlling our decision in 
Pennsylvania Nurses Ass'n v. Pennsylvania State Educ. 
Ass'n, 90 F.3d 797 (3d Cir. 1996). In that case, two labor 
organizations were competing for the right to represent 
nurses in several health care facilities. The Nurses 
Association filed eleven state tort law claims against its 
rival, the Education Association. The district court held 
that nine claims were preempted by federal labor law and 
granted judgment on the pleadings as to those counts, but 
it held that two were not preempted and remanded them to 
the state court. The Nurses Association appealed, and the 
Education Association cross-appealed. 
 
We held that we had appellate jurisdiction underS 1291 
because a discretionary remand under S 1367(c)(3) divests 
a federal court of "all control over the action." 90 F.3d at 
801; accord Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 
F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (accepting appellate 
jurisdiction after S 1367(c)(3) remand to review district 
court's discretionary order). This is consistent with our 
reasoning in Carr, where we noted that appellate review of 
a discretionary remand under S 1367(c)(3) is appropriate 
because the practical effect of rejecting jurisdiction would 
have been to render a party unable to obtain later review of 
that decision. See Carr, 17 F.3d at 678. 
 
We have essentially the same circumstance here: 
preemption of a state-law claim and remand of the 
remaining claims to state court. Following Pennsylvania 
Nurses Association, we conclude that jurisdiction lies under 
S 1291. As a result, U.S. Healthcare's petition for a writ of 
mandamus is moot. See Pennsylvania Nurses Ass'n, 90 
F.3d at 801. Jurisdiction over the Baumans' cross-appeal 
from the dismissal of Count Six raises no issue as it is 
clearly final under S 1291. 
 
III. 
 
Turning to the merits of the parties' contentions, we 
review the District Court's decision to remand under 
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S 1367(c)(3) for abuse of discretion; however, to the extent 
that the underlying issue giving rise to that remand 
decision, in this case the extent of preemption, is one of 
law, our review is de novo. See Engelhardt, 139 F.3d at 
1351 n.4; Zuniga v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 52 
F.3d 1395, 1400 (6th Cir. 1995). U.S. Healthcare argues 
that the District Court erred when it concluded that ERISA 
does not completely preempt Counts One, Two and Five of 
the Baumans' complaint. The Baumans argue that the 
court erred when it ruled Count Six was completely 
preempted. 
 
A. 
 
Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, federal 
jurisdiction is lacking unless a federal question appears on 
the face of a properly pleaded complaint; a federal defense 
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction. See Franchise 
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for 
S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1983); Louisville & Nashville R.R. 
Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). There is nothing 
on the face of the Baumans' complaint that reveals any 
federal cause of action, and it is manifest that they have 
not, through "artful pleading," sought to defeat jurisdiction 
that would otherwise be apparent on the face of the 
complaint. See Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 704 (9th 
Cir. 1998). Hence, according to the usual operation of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule, federal jurisdiction would be 
lacking where, as here, the complaint is based entirely on 
state law. 
 
U.S. Healthcare seeks to fall within the narrow exception 
to the well-pleaded complaint rule for instances where 
Congress has expressed its intent to "completely pre-empt" 
a particular area of law such that any claim that falls 
within this area is "necessarily federal in character." 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 
(1987). Unlike ordinary preemption, which would only arise 
as a federal defense to a state-law claim, complete 
preemption operates to confer original federal subject 
matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the absence of a federal 
cause of action on the face of the complaint. The Supreme 
Court has held that in enacting the civil-enforcement 
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provisions of section 502(a) of ERISA, Congress intended to 
completely preempt state law. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987). 
 
As Professor Wright has noted, "preemption" is used in 
the law in more than one sense. Charles Alan Wright, Law 
of Federal Courts S 238 at 230. It is important to 
distinguish complete preemption under section 502(a) of 
ERISA, which is used in this sense as a jurisdictional 
concept, from express preemption under section 514(a) of 
ERISA, which is a substantive concept governing the 
applicable law. See Joyce v. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp., 
126 F.3d 166, 171-72 (3d Cir. 1997). There are instances in 
which the Supreme Court has implied a congressional 
intent to preempt state law, see, e.g., International Paper 
Co. v. Ovellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987), but it 
included an express preemption provision in ERISA. Section 
514(a) provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan. . . ." 29 U.S.C.S 1144(a). State- 
law claims that are subject to express preemption are 
displaced and thus subject to dismissal. See Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). 
Claims that are completely preempted are "necessarily 
federal in character," and thus are converted into federal 
claims. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63. 
 
Consequently, to determine whether any of the claims 
stated in the Baumans' complaint are completely 
preempted, we consider whether they "fall within the scope 
of" ERISA's civil-enforcement provisions. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 
355. U.S. Healthcare argues that the complaint essentially 
seeks recovery under state law for the HMO's denial of 
benefits under a health-benefits plan governed by ERISA. It 
continues, because section 502(a)(1)(B) creates a cause of 
action to recover such benefits, all of the Baumans' claims, 
including those asserted in Counts One, Two and Five, 
come within that section and are therefore completely 
preempted. Under section 502(a)(1)(B), a participant or 
beneficiary may bring an action "to recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under 
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(a)(1)(B). 
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We last considered the operation of this provision in the 
context of medical malpractice actions in Dukes, where we 
reviewed the complaints filed in two consolidated cases. In 
one of these cases, the widow of Darryl Dukes, who had 
been a participant in a U.S. Healthcare HMO, filed an 
action in state court alleging medical malpractice and 
negligence against numerous defendants based on the 
failure of the doctors to perform a blood test that would 
have revealed the patient's high blood sugar levels. The 
complaint also alleged that the HMO was both vicariously 
liable and directly negligent in failing to use reasonable care 
in, inter alia, screening, evaluating, and monitoring the 
providers of the medical services dispensed to beneficiaries. 
See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352. In the second case, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the obstetrician who treated the 
expectant mother negligently ignored symptoms of 
preeclampsia, and that this negligence resulted in a 
stillbirth. The plaintiffs also sued the HMO on theories of 
ostensible and actual agency as well as for negligence in its 
"selection, employment, and oversight of the medical 
personnel who performed the actual medical treatment." Id. 
at 353. 
 
We rejected U.S. Healthcare's complete preemption 
arguments in both cases. Analyzing the gravamen of the 
complaints, we observed that neither one pled state claims 
falling within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme 
because there was nothing raised regarding a failure"to 
provide benefits due under the plan." The plaintiffs did not 
allege that the failure to perform the tests arose in any way 
from a denial of benefits under the ERISA plan involved. 
See id. at 356-57. Rather, both complaints asserted claims 
regarding the quality of the care received. See id. at 357. 
We emphasized that the statutory language permitting an 
ERISA action to " `recover benefits due. . . under the terms 
of [the] plan' is concerned exclusively with whether or not 
the benefits due under the plan were actually provided. The 
statute simply says nothing about the quality of benefits 
received." Id. Nor could we find any basis in the legislative 
history for concluding that quality claims, as opposed to 
quantity ones, would be completely preempted. See id. 
 
Similarly, we rejected U.S. Healthcare's arguments that 
the complaints at issue raised claims regarding"rights 
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under the terms of the plan;" we held that the phrase 
applied to such matters as benefit eligibility procedures, as 
opposed to a specific benefit under the plan. See id. 
Moreover, the negligence counts alleged claims under pre- 
existing state law rather than "new `rights under the terms 
of the plan.' " Id. at 358. We observed that "patients enjoy 
the right to be free from medical malpractice regardless of 
whether . . . care is provided through an ERISA plan." Id. 
 
Perhaps the most significant contribution made by the 
Dukes opinion was the distinction drawn between (1) state- 
law claims directed to the quality of benefits provided, 
which are not completely preempted, and (2) claims"that 
the plans erroneously withheld benefits due" or that seek 
"to enforce [plaintiffs'] rights under their respective plans or 
to clarify their rights to future benefits," which are subject 
to complete preemption. Id. at 356. To reiterate, we 
embraced a distinction between claims pertaining to the 
quality of the medical benefits provided to a plan 
participant and claims that the plan participant was 
entitled to, but did not receive, a certain quantum of 
benefits under his or her plan. See id. at 357-58. 
 
There are some cases in which it may be difficult to 
distinguish between claims challenging the quality of 
benefits rather than their quantity. See id. ("We recognize 
that the distinction between the quantity of benefits due 
under a welfare plan and the quality of those benefits will 
not always be clear. . . ."). These difficulties arise, at least in 
part, because the same HMO may have assumed both the 
role as a plan administrator and the separate role as a 
provider of medical services. 
 
As an administrator overseeing an ERISA plan, an HMO 
will have administrative responsibilities over the elements 
of the plan, including determining eligibility for benefits, 
calculating those benefits, disbursing them to the 
participant, monitoring available funds, and keeping 
records. As we held in Dukes, claims that fall within the 
essence of the administrator's activities in this regard fall 
within section 502(a)(1)(B) and are completely preempted. 
 
In contrast, as noted by the Secretary, when the HMO 
acts under the ERISA plan as a health care provider, it 
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arranges and provides medical treatment, directly or 
through contracts with hospitals, doctors, or nurses. See 
Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361; see also Corcoran v. United 
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329-34 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(recognizing that HMOs act as both health care providers 
and plan administrators). In performing these activities, the 
HMO is not acting in its capacity as a plan administrator 
but as a provider of health care, subject to the prevailing 
state standard of care. For obvious reasons, U.S. 
Healthcare contends that all of the Baumans' claims 
against it fall into the administrative category, which are 
completely preempted, and that therefore the remand of the 
three counts to state court was erroneous. 
 
In examining the language of Counts One, Two, and Five, 
we conclude that the District Court did not err in holding 
that these counts were not completely preempted. It is 
significant that none of these three counts as pled alleges 
a failure to provide or authorize benefits under the plan, 
and the Baumans do not claim anywhere in these counts 
that they were denied any of the benefits that were due 
under the plan. 
 
Count One challenges U.S. Healthcare's policy of 
presumptively discharging newborn infants within twenty- 
four hours. This count alleges that the HMO adopted and 
implemented this policy "without adequate consideration 
for whether this policy was medically appropriate." App. at 
16. The count charges U.S. Healthcare with both direct 
negligence for the adoption and implementation of the 
policy and with vicarious liability for the negligence of Dr. 
Nemeh and Kennedy Hospital. 
 
We have already held in Dukes that a vicarious liability 
claim against U.S. Healthcare for a doctor's malpractice 
does not fall within the scope of section 502(a)(1)(B). In this 
case, the vicarious liability claim arising from Michelina's 
premature discharge, as stated in Count One, is 
indistinguishable in any meaningful way from those that we 
held were not completely preempted in Dukes. 
 
With respect to the direct negligence claim, the Baumans' 
challenge to U.S. Healthcare's twenty-four-hour discharge 
policy is directed at the HMO's actions in what we 
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characterized in Dukes as an HMO's role in "arranging for 
medical treatment" rather than its role as a plan 
administrator determining what benefits are appropriate. 
Dukes, 57 F.3d at 360. Thus, it is the HMO's essentially 
medical determination of the appropriate level of care that 
the Baumans claim contributed to the death of their 
daughter. This is not a claim that a certain benefit was 
requested and denied. As the Secretary points out, under 
the facts as pleaded in the complaint, U.S. Healthcare's 
policy and incentive structure were such that "the 
Baumans never had the option of making an informed 
decision as to whether to pay for the hospitalization 
themselves," as would occur in a situation in which 
coverage is sought and denied. Secretary of Labor Br. at 19. 
Accordingly, this claim fits squarely within the class of 
claims that we identified in Dukes as involving the quality 
of care. Here, as in Dukes, "the plaintiffs . . . are attempting 
to hold the HMO[ ] liable for [its] role as the arranger[ ] of 
their [decedent's] medical treatment." Dukes, 57 F.3d at 
361. 
 
Count Two challenges the same actions by the HMO. It 
differs from Count One principally in that it charges 
reckless indifference on the part of U.S. Healthcare. This 
count charges that U.S. Healthcare adopted its twenty-four 
hour presumptive discharge policy "knowing . . . that many 
infants would be put at risk for life-threatening disease 
after leaving the hospital" and that the HMO thus acted 
with reckless indifference to the health consequences of 
this policy. App. at 17. Like the negligence claim based 
upon the discharge policy, this count goes to the quality of 
care that Michelina received rather than an administrative 
decision as to whether certain benefits were covered by the 
plan. 
 
We reject U.S. Healthcare's characterization of these 
counts as "quintessential" challenges to the quantity of 
benefits due under an ERISA plan. The allegations in 
Counts One and Two do not raise the failure of U.S. 
Healthcare to pay for a benefit or process a claim for 
benefits as the basis for the injury suffered. The counts are 
phrased in terms of the quality of the medical care 
provided. 
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In a similar vein, Count Five charges that U.S. 
Healthcare was "negligent in adopting hospital utilization 
policies . . . that discouraged . . . physicians from re- 
admitting infants to the hospital when health problems 
were identified subsequent to [their] discharge from the 
hospital." App. at 20. Additionally, Count Five alleges that 
U.S. Healthcare was negligent in its "selection, supervision, 
training, and/or monitoring of Dr. Nemeh." Id. 
 
Both aspects of this count also pertain to U.S. 
Healthcare's actions in its role as a provider or arranger of 
medical services. As the Baumans allege, the HMO adopted 
policies that "encouraged, pressured, and/or directly or 
indirectly required" their participating physicians to 
discharge newborn infants and that also discouraged 
physicians to readmit newborn infants when the 
appropriate standard of care required otherwise under state 
law. App. at 16, 20. Assuming these allegations are true, as 
we must when considering a motion to dismiss, the 
Baumans seek recovery for decisions that U.S. Healthcare 
made in providing and arranging medical services, 
decisions that adversely influenced the medical judgment of 
its participating physicians. 
 
Similarly, the portion of Count Five that alleges 
negligence in the HMO's selection, supervision, training, 
and/or oversight of Dr. Nemeh addresses not plan- 
administration decisions, but rather decisions that the 
HMO allegedly made in the course of arranging for the 
provision of medical services. This claim is 
indistinguishable from the Viscontis' claim in Dukes that 
the HMO was "negligent in its selection, employment, and 
oversight of the medical personnel who performed the 
actual medical treatment," which we held was not subject 
to complete preemption. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353, 358-59. 
Such claims do not involve an attempt to recover benefits 
due, enforce rights, or clarify future benefits under a plan, 
but rather seek recovery under "the quality standard found 
in the otherwise applicable [state] law." Id. at 359. 
 
U.S. Healthcare emphasizes that the language in this 
count refers to its adoption of policies "with respect to 
hospital utilization by its participating physicians," and it 
argues that Dukes compels the conclusion that all claims 
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regarding "utilization" are necessarily about "refus[al] to 
provide the services to which membership entitled" 
beneficiaries, an administrative rather than health-provider 
function. U.S. Healthcare Reply Br. at 20-21. A fair reading 
of Count Five shows that it is not directed at the"utilization 
review" process referred to in Dukes. The"utilization 
review" to which Dukes was referring is"a cost-containment 
service," which entails prospective and concurrent 
assessments of the appropriateness of medical and hospital 
care. See, e.g., Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1323, 1327. 
Utilization review in that sense is unrelated to the claim in 
Count Five that raises the quality-of-care consequences of 
the pre-certification policy, as well as U.S. Healthcare's 
negligent oversight of its doctors when it acted as a medical 
provider. Indeed, U.S. Healthcare's statement at oral 
argument that the twenty-four hour pre-certification policy 
is not a hard and fast rule and can be extended as the 
doctor sees fit only reinforces the view that it is a 
discretionary medical decision rather than an 
administrative one. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the District Court did not 
err in holding that Counts One, Two, and Five were not 
claims "to recover benefits due . . . under the terms of [the] 
plan, falling within section 502," and hence were not 
completely preempted. 
 
B. 
 
In their cross-appeal, the Baumans contend that the 
District Court erred in concluding that Count Six was 
completely preempted. Here, as above, we look to the 
nature of the claims as reflected by the language of the 
count. The District Court read the language of Count Six, 
alleging U.S. Healthcare's negligence in "not providing for 
[an in-home] visit by a participating provider[a pediatric 
nurse], despite assurances under its L'il Appleseed program 
that such a visit would be provided and despite a telephone 
call . . . from the Baumans requesting this service," as 
stating a claim that fits under section 502(a). Therefore, the 
court held that it was completely preempted, and 
subsequently dismissed. We cannot say that the District 
Court was unreasonable in so holding. 
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On the other hand, the Baumans urge this court to 
interpret the complaint as a state cause of action for 
violating a tort duty "to provide [the Bauman family] 
adequate medical care, rather than a violation of a 
[contractual] promise . . . made to them in their ERISA 
plan." Bauman Br. at 34. The Secretary concurs with the 
Baumans' position. PAlthough the question as to Count Six 
is a close one, we agree with the Baumans and the 
Secretary that Count Six raises a claim regarding the 
adequacy of the care that Michelina Bauman received and 
is therefore directed toward the HMO's action in its capacity 
as a medical provider, rather than as a benefits 
administrator. As is the case in the earlier counts, Count 
Six raises an issue regarding the inadequacy of the quality 
of care provided under the plan. The mere fact that the 
Baumans referred in their complaint to a benefit promised 
by their health care plan does not automatically convert 
their state-law negligence claim into a claim for benefits 
under section 502. If, as the Baumans contend, U.S. 
Healthcare failed to meet the standard of care required of 
health care providers by failing to arrange for a pediatric 
nurse in a timely manner, Count Six sets forth an ordinary 
state-law tort claim for medical malpractice. 
 
We recognize that we observed in Dukes that in some 
cases the quality of care may be "so low that the treatment 
received simply will not qualify as health care at all. In 
such a case, it well may be appropriate to conclude that the 
plan participant or beneficiary has been denied benefits due 
under the plan." Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358. This was plain 
dictum in Dukes, as there were no facts suggesting such 
patently low treatment. As dictum, it does not bind this 
panel. See McGurl v. Trucking Employees of North Jersey 
Welfare Fund, Inc., 124 F.3d 471, 484 (3d Cir. 1997). We 
note in passing that U.S. Healthcare has not suggested that 
its failure to provide the pediatric nurse was such grossly 
inadequate health care as to fall within the dictum, and so 
we have no occasion to comment on when it would be 
applicable, if at all. 
 
After it concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction 
over Count Six, the District Court dismissed that count as 
expressly preempted by section 514(a), 29 U.S.C.S 1144(a), 
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on the force of its determination that the count was 
completely preempted. Inasmuch as we conclude that 
Count Six was not completely preempted, the District Court 
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint 
and should have remanded it to state court under 28 
U.S.C. S 1447(c).3 As we stated in Dukes, "[w]hen the 
doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the 
plaintiff's state claim is arguably preempted underS 514(a), 
the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, 
cannot resolve the dispute regarding preemption." Dukes, 
57 F.3d at 355. 
 
IV. 
 
We will affirm the District Court's decision that Counts 
One, Two, and Five are not completely preempted, and we 
will reverse its decision that Count Six is completely 
preempted and reverse its order dismissing Count Six. We 
will therefore remand to the District Court with instructions 
to remand Count Six to the New Jersey state court from 
which it was removed. It is that court that will be in a 
position to decide the express preemption issue, should 
U.S. Healthcare raise it there. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As a result of our disposition, we need not reach U.S. Healthcare's 
contention that the District Court itself should have decided whether the 
claims were expressly preempted under section 514 of ERISA, rather 
than remanding that issue to the state court. 
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